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COMMENTARY
Death and the Supreme Court
By ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG*
In the summer of 1963, during my tenure on the Supreme Court, in
reviewing the list of cases to be discussed when the Court reconvened for
the 1963 Term in October, I found there were six capital cases seeking
review by certiorari.' In studying these cases, I came to the conclusion
that they presented the Court with an opportunity to address explicitly
for the first time the constitutionality of capital punishment. I thereupon
prepared a conference memorandum2 on this subject which I circulated
to the members of the Court for their consideration.
In this memorandum, I stated:
This Court has never explicitly considered whether, and under
what circumstances, the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution [proscribe] the imposition of the
death penalty. The Court has, of course, implicitly decided (in
every case affirming a capital conviction) that the death penalty is
constitutional. But in light of the worldwide trend toward aboli-
tion, I think this Court should now request argument and explic-
itly consider this constantly recurring issue.3
In my memorandum, I marshalled the arguments and precedents
against the death penalty. My conclusion was twofold: the death penalty
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment proscribed by the Eighth4 and
* Former Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States.
1. Snider v. Cunningham, 292 F.2d 683 (4th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 889 (1963)
(rape of a minor); Rudolph v. Alabama, 275 Ala. 115, 152 So. 2d 662, cert. denied, 375 U.S.
889, reh'g denied, 375 U.S. 917 (1963) (rape); Walker v. Nevada, 78 Nev. 463, 376 P.2d 137
(1962), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 882 (1963) (felony murder); Arnold v. North Carolina, 258 N.C.
563, 129 S.E.2d 229, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 878, rev'd on other grounds, 376 U.S. 773 (1963)
(murder); Smith v. Bomar, 212 Tenn. 149, 368 S.W.2d 748, cert. denied, 376 U.S. 915 (1963)
(felony murder); White v. Washington, 60 Wash. 2d 551, 374 P.2d 942 (1962), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 883 (1963) (murder).
2. Goldberg, J., Memorandum to the Conference, Re. Capital Punishment, October
Term, 1963, reprinted in 27 S. TEX. L. REv. 493 (1986).
3. Id. at 499.
4. The Eighth Amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required.... nor cruel
and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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Fourteenth5 Amendments to the United States Constitution. If a major-
ity of the Court were unwilling to so hold, it should, in my view, rule that
the death penalty could not constitutionally be imposed for an offense
that did not involve the taking of human life.
When the Court reconvened on the first Monday in October, 1963,
at its initial conference, a majority voted to reject the contentions and
conclusions of my memorandum. The vote was six to three. Only Jus-
tices Douglas and Brennan joined in support of my views.
The Court then proceeded to deny certiorari in the six capital cases
before it.6 In one of them, Rudolph v. Alabama,7 the petitioner was sen-
tenced to death for rape, a horrendous offense which, however, did not
involve the taking of human life. The Court denied the grant of certio-
rari. I dissented on the ground that the death penalty was cruel and
unusual punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment since
there was no taking of human life.8 Only Justices Douglas and Brennan
joined in this dissent.
Although my efforts to declare the death penalty unconstitutional
were unsuccessful, an important consequence was to alert the Bar to
challenge the constitutionality of capital sentencing laws, which had not
been previously done, even in the six cases upon which we ruled. There-
after, beginning in 1965, the constitutionality of the death penalty was
raised by counsel in a wide variety of cases. 9 Confronted squarely with
the issue, the Court was forced to deal with both procedural and substan-
tive challenges to the death penalty. This being the case, the Court, to
consider these challenges, imposed a de facto moratorium on executions
5. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides: "No State shall ... deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § 1.
Although a restraint on federal conduct, the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the
Eighth Amendment has been held applicable to states by its incorporation in the due process
guaranty of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667
(1962); Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 462 (1947).
6. See supra note 1.
7. 275 Ala. 115, 152 So. 2d 662, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 889, reh'g denied, 375 U.S. 917
(1963).
8. 375 U.S. at 889-91.
9. The Court declined to hear cases raising eighth amendment challenges to the constitu-
tionality of capital sentencing laws. See, e.g., Alvarez v. Nebraska, 393 U.S. 823 (1968) (denial
of certiorari); Craig v. Florida, 383 U.S. 959 (1966) (denial of certiorari); Swain v. Alabama,
382 U.S. 944 (1965) (denial of certiorari).
The issue was extensively briefed and argued before the Court in Boykin v. Alabama, 395
U.S. 238 (1969). See Brief for Petitioner at 8-24. However, the Court reversed the conviction
on procedural grounds without referring to the constitutionality of the death penalty.
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which lasted from 1968 to 1976.10
In 1972, the Supreme Court decided in Furman v. Georgia that the
sentencing authority, judge or jury, cannot exercise untrammeled discre-
tion to pronounce life or death in capital cases, but that rational stan-
dards must be used to make this determination. The sentencing
authority was required to weigh various mitigating and aggravating fac-
tors in deciding whether an individual should be put to death.' 2 In other
words, as the Court later made clear, mandatory capital sentencing laws
were unconstitutional.
13
Since most states had mandatory sentencing laws, and these were
unconstitutional, the convictions of more than 600 inmates of death cells
were reversed.14 They were not set free, however, but resentenced. Vir-
tually all of them were then given life imprisonment.15 Litigation, how-
ever, continued with respect to other aspects of the death penalty, thus
keeping the moratorium in effect while states proceeded to amend their
laws to conform to the Court's decision in Furman.
In 1976, in Gregg v. Georgia,16 the Court for the first time squarely
held that "the punishment of death does not invariably violate [the Cruel
and Unusual Punishment Clause of] the Constitution."' 7 It did so by a
divided vote.1" This was a deplorable step backward. It legitimated the
imposition of this ultimate sanction.
Opponents of the death penalty continued to litigate, raising other
issues. In 1977, in Coker v. Georgia,9 the Court held that imposing the
death penalty on a convicted rapist who did not take the life of the victim
10. See UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1981, A NATIONAL
PRISONER STATISTICS REPORT Table 1, at 14 (1982).
11. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (plurality opinion).
12. The plurality opinion turned on the separate concurrences of Justices Stewart and
White. Both declined to rule that the death penalty was unconstitutional in all applications,
but held that its arbitrary imposition constituted cruel and unusual punishment. In rejecting
Georgia's capital sentencing law, Justice White explained that "the death penalty is exacted
with great infrequency even for the most atrocious crimes and ... there is no meaningful basis
for distinguishing the few cases in which it is imposed from the many cases in which it is not."
Id. at 313.
13. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S.
280 (1976).
14. See N.Y. Times, June 30, 1972, at 1, col. 8.
15. Bruck, Decisions of Death, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 12, 1983, at 18-19.
16. 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion).
17. Id. at 169.
18. Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Powell and Stevens, announced the opinion of the
Court, id. at 158; Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, con-
curred in the judgment, id. at 207; Justice Blackmun concurred without an opinion, id. at 227;
and Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented separately, id. at 227, 231.
19. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
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was unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.20 In Coker, the
Court adopted my dissenting opinion in Rudolph v. Alabama.2" This led
to the resentencing of persons convicted of such crimes. My only com-
ment is that in the Supreme Court, as in life in general, time works
changes.
The moratorium imposed by the Court on the death penalty, how-
ever, was not lifted until 1977.22 This was because the Court, in a
number of cases, had to pass on state sentencing laws that had been re-
drafted to meet the Gregg test. The Court sustained these statutes23 and
made it clear by decisions and denials of certiorari that states were free to
proceed with executions in capital cases, as they regrettably now are do-
ing. Since 1977, nearly ninety persons convicted of capital offenses,
under statutes conforming to Gregg, have been executed.24
Opponents of the death penalty, notwithstanding, have continued
their challenge on other grounds. In McCleskey v. Kemp,25 the death
penalty was attacked on the ground, supported by substantial evidence,
that it was disproportionately imposed on blacks and other racial minor-
ity groups. The Court rejected this contention.
More recently, on July 29, 1987, the Court denied a stay of execu-
tion in Brogdon v. Butler,26 which involved the question of whether a
mentally defective person with a chronological age of twenty-four but the
mentality of a ten-year-old could be executed. Regrettably, the Court, in
denying this stay, reached out and touched Brogdon fatally by telephone,
a practice which I have deplored.27 In this case, as in previous ones, the
Justices, being on vacation, were scattered here and abroad. They were
polled by telephone, and this poll resulted in a denial of the stay. Indeed,
it is unlikely that, with the exception of the Chief Justice who was in
Washington, D.C., any of the Justices had the benefit of study and review
of the stay application.
Why the rush to execution? This case could have been referred to
the first conference when the Court reconvened in October. The defend-
20. Id. at 592.
21. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
22. Gary Gilmore was executed on Jan. 17, 1977. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1977, at 1,
col. 4.
23. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (upholding death penalty statute); Proffitt v.
Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (same); but see Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976)
(invalidating death penalty statute).
24. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1987, at 1, col. 2 (reporting 86 executions as of Aug. 9, 1987).
25. 107 S. Ct. 1756, reh'g denied, 107 S. Ct. 3199 (1987).
26. 824 F.2d 338 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 13 (1987).
27. Goldberg, The Supreme Court Reaches Out and Touches Someone-Fatally, 10 HAST-
INGS CONST. L.Q. 7 (1982).
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ant, after all, was confined to a death cell, and there is no good reason
why this customary practice was not followed, affording all Justices ac-
cess to the record and briefs and an adequate collegiate discussion of the
issues raised.
In view of the present membership of the Court, there is no likeli-
hood that the Court will overrule its holding in Gregg in the foreseeable
future. Watchman, what of the night? Or, to put it in other terms,
where other than the Court, can opponents of the death penalty turn for
relief?
The answer is Congress and state legislatures, courts, and gover-
nors. I am not optimistic that, with few exceptions, they will abolish the
death penalty. Public opinion polls show that a majority of the public
now favors the death penalty.2" The bodies I have mentioned are more
than likely to follow these "election returns." Nevertheless, public opin-
ion on this grave matter has changed in the past and, hopefully, it may
change again in the not too distant future.
Further, there is a widespread and mistaken notion, not only in the
public's mind but among these governing bodies, that once the Supreme
Court has spoken, this is the final word. Not so! There is nothing in the
Constitution that precludes Congress, state legislatures, state courts, or
governors from abolishing or not imposing the death penalty, despite the
Supreme Court's unwillingness to do so. These bodies may go beyond
the Court in protecting individual freedoms, including the safeguard
against cruel and unusual punishment. What they may not do is restrict
or cut back on Supreme Court decisions.29 In other words, they may not
invoke the discredited doctrines of interposition and nullification3"
which were designed to limit constitutional safeguards mandated by the
Supreme Court.
In addition, Congress, under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
28. For example, a recent Gallup opinion poll found that 71% of Americans favor the
death penalty for persons convicted of murder; 23% were opposed and 5% did not know.
Gallup, The Gallup Report, Report Nos. 232/233 (Jan.-Feb. 1985), reprinted in U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATIsTIcs-1986 Table 2.23, at 100-01
(1987).
29. See, e.g., Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980) (upholding
free speech rights under California Constitution).
30. These doctrines held that a state, in the exercise of its sovereignty, may reject the
jurisdiction of federal courts when the state deemed it to be unconstitutional or to exceed the
powers delegated to the federal government. This position was rejected in Fletcher v. Peck, 10
U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810) (invalidating state law under federal Constitution). See also Martin
v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
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ment, may declare that capital punishment violates due process. 3 1 Thus,
with one blow, Congress has the authority to abolish capital punishment
throughout the United States.
Also, state legislatures and courts may interpret the language of
their own constitutions as prohibiting the death penalty, notwithstanding
that the language of most state constitutions is the same or similar to the
Eighth Amendment. 32 The right of states to do so is an established prin-
ciple of federalism and not subject to review by the Supreme Court. Fi-
nally, state governors may commute death sentences, both on
constitutional and moral grounds.
So, the ball is in the court of Congress and the legislatures, courts,
and governors of the several states. These bodies cannot escape the real-
ity that 1900 persons are now incarcerated in death cells33 and that more
will follow. They cannot escape the reality that the executions of such
persons will be nothing more than governmental mass murder. And they
cannot ignore the fact that all reliable studies show that there is no pro-
bative evidence that the death penalty effectively deters capital offenses. 4
Deterrence, after all, is the ultimate rationale for capital punishment.
More than twenty-five years ago, French author Albert Camus
wrote that "the great civilizing step" is to abolish the death penalty. 35
Virtually all Western countries have done so and many neutral and
nonaligned countries as well. 36 The ultimate question is: shall our na-
tion continue to live under the archaic doctrine of lex talionis-an eye for
an eye; a tooth for a tooth?
31. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides: "The Congress shall have power to
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV,
§ 5. For the due process guaranty, see supra note 5.
32. See, e.g., People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1972)
(holding death penalty barred by state constitutional prohibition of "cruel or unusual" punish-
ments). The Anderson decision was eventually reversed by a constitutional initiative.
33. See Applebome, Executions on the Rise as Legal Barriers Fall, N.Y. Times, Aug. 9,
1987, at 22, col. 1.
34. See, e.g., Lampert, The Effect of Executions on Homicides: A New Look on an Old
Light, 29 CRIME & DELINQ. 88 (1973); Baldus & Cole, A Comparison of the Work of Thorston
Sellin and Isaac Ehrlich on the Deterrent Effect of the Death Penalty, 85 YALE L.J. 170 (1985);
see also H. BEDAU, DEATH IS DIFFERENT 33-44 (1987).
35. A. CAMUS, Reflections on the Guillotine, in RESISTANCE, REBELLION AND DEATH
232 (1961).
36. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE DEATH PENALTY
app. 12 (1987).
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